

# The Observability Radius of Network Systems

## Minimum-norm structured perturbations preventing observability

G. Bianchin   **P. Frasca**   A. Gasparri   F. Pasqualetti



NeCS meeting  
Grenoble, France  
November 2, 2016


# Perturbations against observability

- Dynamical network described by

graph  $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$

$x(t+1) = Ax(t)$

$A$  is consistent with the graph



# Perturbations against observability

- Dynamical network described by


$$\text{graph } \mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$$

$$x(t+1) = Ax(t)$$

$A$  is consistent with the graph

- Monitored by **sensor nodes**  $\mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$

$$y(t) = C_{\mathcal{O}}x(t)$$



# Perturbations against observability

- Dynamical network described by

$$\text{graph } \mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$$


$$x(t+1) = Ax(t)$$

$A$  is consistent with the graph

- Monitored by **sensor nodes**  $\mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$

$$y(t) = C_{\mathcal{O}}x(t)$$

- Attacks/failures occur at some **edges**  $\mathcal{M} \subseteq \mathcal{E}$



# Perturbations against observability

- Dynamical network described by

$$\text{graph } \mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$$


$$x(t+1) = Ax(t)$$

$A$  is consistent with the graph

- Monitored by **sensor nodes**  $\mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$

$$y(t) = C_{\mathcal{O}}x(t)$$

- Attacks/failures occur at some **edges**  $\mathcal{M} \subseteq \mathcal{E}$



# Perturbations against observability

- Dynamical network described by

$$\text{graph } \mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$$


$$x(t+1) = Ax(t)$$

$A$  is consistent with the graph

- Monitored by **sensor nodes**  $\mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$

$$y(t) = C_{\mathcal{O}}x(t)$$

- Attacks/failures occur at some **edges**  $\mathcal{M} \subseteq \mathcal{E}$



- Can the adversary make the dynamics unobservable?
- How large the perturbation must be?

# Topics in this talk

- 1 Observability radius: from classical systems to networks
  - The observability radius of linear systems
  - The observability radius of network systems
- 2 An algorithm for the observability radius
- 3 The role of topology: networks with random weights
- 4 Attacks on power systems

# Classical observability radius

Before perturbation,  $(A, C)$  is observable

$$x(t+1) = Ax(t)$$

$$y(t) = Cx(t)$$

The **observability radius** is

$$\mu(A, C) = \min_{\Delta_A, \Delta_C} \left\| \begin{bmatrix} \Delta_A \\ \Delta_C \end{bmatrix} \right\|_2,$$

s.t.  $(A + \Delta_A, C + \Delta_C)$  is unobservable



# Classical observability radius

Before perturbation,  $(A, C)$  is observable

$$x(t+1) = Ax(t)$$

$$y(t) = Cx(t)$$

The **observability radius** is

$$\mu(A, C) = \min_{\Delta_A, \Delta_C} \left\| \begin{bmatrix} \Delta_A \\ \Delta_C \end{bmatrix} \right\|_2,$$

s.t.  $(A + \Delta_A, C + \Delta_C)$  is unobservable

Typical result: 
$$\mu(A, C) = \min_{s \in \mathbb{C}} \sigma_n \left( \begin{bmatrix} sI - A \\ C \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

R. Eising. Between controllable and uncontrollable. *Systems & Control Letters*, 4(5):263–264, 1984

## Shortcomings:

- unstructured:  $\Delta_A$  and  $\Delta_C$  are full matrices
- both  $A$  and  $C$  are perturbed
- 2-norm does not quantify the effort of an attacker

# Our problem: perturbations of dynamical networks

Localized observation matrix:

$$\mathcal{O} = \{o_1, \dots, o_p\} \text{ and } C_{\mathcal{O}} = [e_{o_1} \ \cdots \ e_{o_p}]^T$$

The **network observability radius** is

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\Delta} \|\Delta\|_F^2, \\ \text{s.t. } (A + \Delta, C_{\mathcal{O}}) \text{ is unobservable} \\ \Delta \cdot M = 0 \end{aligned}$$

where

- *structure* is imposed:  $M_{ij} = 0$  if  $(i, j) \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $M_{ij} = 1$  if  $(i, j) \notin \mathcal{M}$   
· is entrywise product
- Frobenius norm  $\|\Delta\|_F^2 = \sum_{i,j} \delta_{ij}^2$  is chosen
- only  $A$  is perturbed

Computing the observability radius

# Computing the observability radius

More explicitly:

$\min_{\Delta, \lambda, x}$	$\ \Delta\ _F^2$	Frobenius norm
s.t.	$C_O x = 0$	unobservability
	$(A + \Delta)x = \lambda x$	eigenvalue constraint
	$\ x\ _2 = 1$	normalization
	$\Delta \cdot M = 0$	structural constraint

## Comments:

- The optimization is performed over  $\Delta$ ,  $\lambda$ , and  $x$
- Not convex
- Not always feasible (feasible if  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{E}$ )
- Since  $(A, C)$  is observable,  $\Delta$  must be nonzero

# Idea for an algorithm

**Step 1:** Fix  $\lambda$  and solve

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{x, \Delta} & \|\Delta\|_F^2 \\ \text{s.t.} & C_0 x = 0 \\ & (A + \Delta)x = \lambda x \\ & \|x\|_2 = 1 \\ & \Delta \cdot M = 0 \end{aligned}$$

**Step 2:** Search for the best  $\lambda \in \mathbb{C}$

Exhaustive search seems unavoidable:

G. Hu and E. J. Davison. Real controllability/stabilizability radius of LTI systems. *IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control*, 49(2):254–257, 2004

# Algorithm (Step 1)

Derivation (sketch):

- 1 Incorporate structural constraints in  $\|\Delta\|_F^2$  (approximately)

$$\text{cost: } \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 \longrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 (1 - m_{ij})^{-1}$$

# Algorithm (Step 1)

Derivation (sketch):

- 1 Incorporate structural constraints in  $\|\Delta\|_F^2$  (approximately)

$$\text{cost: } \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 \longrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 (1 - m_{ij})^{-1}$$

- 2 Decompose  $\lambda = \lambda_{\Re} + i\lambda_{\Im}$ ,  $x = x_{\Re} + ix_{\Im}$  and divide real and imaginary parts

# Algorithm (Step 1)

Derivation (sketch):

- 1 Incorporate structural constraints in  $\|\Delta\|_F^2$  (approximately)

$$\text{cost: } \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 \longrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 (1 - m_{ij})^{-1}$$

- 2 Decompose  $\lambda = \lambda_{\Re} + i\lambda_{\Im}$ ,  $x = x_{\Re} + ix_{\Im}$  and divide real and imaginary parts
- 3 Define Lagrange multipliers for the other constraints and write  $\nabla \mathcal{L} = 0$



# Algorithm (Step 1)

Derivation (sketch):

- 1 Incorporate structural constraints in  $\|\Delta\|_F^2$  (approximately)

$$\text{cost: } \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 \longrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 (1 - m_{ij})^{-1}$$

- 2 Decompose  $\lambda = \lambda_{\Re} + i\lambda_{\Im}$ ,  $x = x_{\Re} + ix_{\Im}$  and divide real and imaginary parts
- 3 Define Lagrange multipliers for the other constraints and write  $\nabla \mathcal{L} = 0$
- 4 Rewrite as generalized nonlinear eigenvalue problem:  
finding scalar  $\sigma$  and vector  $z$  such that  $H z = \sigma K_z z$

# Algorithm (Step 1)

Derivation (sketch):

- 1 Incorporate structural constraints in  $\|\Delta\|_F^2$  (approximately)

$$\text{cost: } \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 \longrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 (1 - m_{ij})^{-1}$$

- 2 Decompose  $\lambda = \lambda_{\Re} + i\lambda_{\Im}$ ,  $x = x_{\Re} + ix_{\Im}$  and divide real and imaginary parts
- 3 Define Lagrange multipliers for the other constraints and write  $\nabla \mathcal{L} = 0$
- 4 Rewrite as generalized nonlinear eigenvalue problem:  
finding scalar  $\sigma$  and vector  $z$  such that  $H z = \sigma K_z z$

# Algorithm (Step 1)

Derivation (sketch):

- 1 Incorporate structural constraints in  $\|\Delta\|_F^2$  (approximately)

$$\text{cost: } \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 \longrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij}^2 (1 - m_{ij})^{-1}$$

- 2 Decompose  $\lambda = \lambda_{\Re} + i\lambda_{\Im}$ ,  $x = x_{\Re} + ix_{\Im}$  and divide real and imaginary parts
- 3 Define Lagrange multipliers for the other constraints and write  $\nabla\mathcal{L} = 0$
- 4 Rewrite as generalized nonlinear eigenvalue problem:

finding scalar  $\sigma$  and vector  $z$  such that  $H_z = \sigma K_z z$

Solve it iteratively by “freezing” the nonlinearity  $K_z$  (inverse iteration method)

If convergent, the algorithm gives a suboptimal solution

Based on ideas from

B. De Moor. Total least squares for affinely structured matrices and the noisy realization problem.  
*IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing*, 42(11):3104–3113, 1994

Networks with random weights

# The effect of disconnecting cuts

Define the minimal observability-preventing perturbation as

$$\begin{aligned} \delta &:= \min_{\lambda, x, \Delta} \|\Delta\|_F \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & C_{\mathcal{O}} x = 0 \\ & (A + \Delta)x = \lambda x \\ & \|x\|_2 = 1 \\ & \Delta \cdot M = 0 \quad (\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{E}) \end{aligned}$$


If  $a_{ij}$  are independent random variables uniformly distributed in  $[0, 1]$ , then

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta] \leq \frac{\Gamma(1/k)}{\sqrt{k}} \frac{\Gamma(\omega + 1)}{\Gamma(\omega + 1 + 1/k)}$$

where


- $\Gamma(z) = \int_0^{\infty} x^{z-1} e^{-x} dx$  is the Gamma function
- $\Omega_k(\mathcal{O})$  is a collection of disjoint cuts of size  $k$ , where each cut disconnects a non-empty subset of nodes from  $\mathcal{O}$
- $\omega = |\Omega_k(\mathcal{O})|$  is the number of such cuts

## Example of application



Looking for disconnecting cuts...

## Example of application




Looking for disconnecting cuts...

### Note:

- The *number* of disconnecting cuts is essential:

$$\frac{\Gamma(1/k)}{\sqrt{k}} \frac{\Gamma(\omega + 1)}{\Gamma(\omega + 1 + 1/k)} \geq 0.8 \frac{1}{\omega + 1}, \quad \text{increasing in } k$$

## Example of application



Looking for disconnecting cuts...

### Note:


- The *number* of disconnecting cuts is essential:

$$\frac{\Gamma(1/k)}{\sqrt{k}} \frac{\Gamma(\omega + 1)}{\Gamma(\omega + 1 + 1/k)} \geq 0.8 \frac{1}{\omega + 1}, \quad \text{increasing in } k$$

- To have a small bound, we need many small cuts



## Example of application



Looking for disconnecting cuts...

$$k = 2, \omega = 4 \implies$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta] \leq \frac{\Gamma(1/2)}{\sqrt{2}} \frac{\Gamma(5)}{\Gamma(5 + 1/2)} = 0.5747$$


### Note:

- The *number* of disconnecting cuts is essential:

$$\frac{\Gamma(1/k)}{\sqrt{k}} \frac{\Gamma(\omega + 1)}{\Gamma(\omega + 1 + 1/k)} \geq 0.8 \frac{1}{\omega + 1}, \quad \text{increasing in } k$$

- To have a small bound, we need many small cuts

## Example of application



Looking for disconnecting cuts...

$$k = 2, \omega = 4 \implies$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta] \leq \frac{\Gamma(1/2)}{\sqrt{2}} \frac{\Gamma(5)}{\Gamma(5 + 1/2)} = 0.5747$$

### Note:

- The *number* of disconnecting cuts is essential:

$$\frac{\Gamma(1/k)}{\sqrt{k}} \frac{\Gamma(\omega + 1)}{\Gamma(\omega + 1 + 1/k)} \geq 0.8 \frac{1}{\omega + 1}, \quad \text{increasing in } k$$

- To have a small bound, we need many small cuts
- Often, the best choice is just isolating single nodes

# Large networks

Consider a sequence of networks with increasing size  $n \rightarrow \infty$ :

If  $\omega \rightarrow \infty$  and  $k$  constant, then

$$\frac{\Gamma(1/k)\Gamma(\omega + 1)}{\sqrt{k}\Gamma(\omega + 1 + 1/k)} \sim \frac{\Gamma(1/k)}{\sqrt{k}} \frac{1}{(\omega + 1)^{1/k}}$$

The network becomes less robust to perturbations as the size of the network increases, with a rate determined by  $k$

# Large networks

Consider a sequence of networks with increasing size  $n \rightarrow \infty$ :

If  $\omega \rightarrow \infty$  and  $k$  constant, then

$$\frac{\Gamma(1/k)\Gamma(\omega+1)}{\sqrt{k}\Gamma(\omega+1+1/k)} \sim \frac{\Gamma(1/k)}{\sqrt{k}} \frac{1}{(\omega+1)^{1/k}}$$


The network becomes less robust to perturbations as the size of the network increases, with a rate determined by  $k$

## Questions:

- Is the bound tight?
- How do optimal perturbations look like?

# The role of graph topology: Examples

Line network



Line is strongly structurally observable




Best perturbation is disconnecting

$$\delta = \max_i \{a_{i,i+1}\}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta(n)] = \frac{1}{n}$$

# The role of graph topology: Examples

Line network



Line is strongly structurally observable




Best perturbation is disconnecting

$$\delta = \max_i \{a_{i,i+1}\}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta(n)] = \frac{1}{n}$$

Star network




Best perturbation introduces  
an artificial symmetry

$$\delta = \min_{i,j \geq 2, i \neq j} \frac{|a_{ii} - a_{jj}|}{\sqrt{2}}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta(n)] \sim \frac{1}{\sqrt{2} n^2} \quad \text{as } n \rightarrow \infty$$

# The role of graph topology: Examples

Line network



Line is strongly structurally observable




Best perturbation is disconnecting

$$\delta = \max_i \{a_{i,i+1}\}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\delta(n)] = \frac{1}{n}$$


Star network



Best perturbation introduces  
an artificial symmetry

$$\delta = \min_{i,j \geq 2, i \neq j} \frac{|a_{ii} - a_{jj}|}{\sqrt{2}}$$


$$\mathbb{E}[\delta(n)] \sim \frac{1}{\sqrt{2} n^2} \quad \text{as } n \rightarrow \infty$$



Real example



# Attacks on power systems



IEEE 14 grid observed from bus 1

**Goal:** inducing an unobservable unstable mode

Small-signal model is linear descriptor system


$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} I & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & M_g & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}}_E \begin{bmatrix} \dot{\delta} \\ \dot{\omega} \\ \dot{\theta} \end{bmatrix} = - \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0 & -I & 0 \\ S_{gg} & D_g & S_{gl} \\ S_{lg} & 0 & S_{ll} \end{bmatrix}}_A \begin{bmatrix} \delta \\ \omega \\ \theta \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ P_\omega \\ P_\theta \end{bmatrix}$$

$\delta$ : generator rotor angles

$\omega$ : generator rotor frequencies

$\theta$ : voltage angles at the buses

# Attacks on power systems



IEEE 14 grid observed from bus 1

Small-signal model is linear descriptor system

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} I & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & M_g & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}}_E \begin{bmatrix} \dot{\delta} \\ \dot{\omega} \\ \dot{\theta} \end{bmatrix} = - \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0 & -I & 0 \\ S_{gg} & D_g & S_{gl} \\ S_{lg} & 0 & S_{ll} \end{bmatrix}}_A \begin{bmatrix} \delta \\ \omega \\ \theta \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ P_\omega \\ P_\theta \end{bmatrix}$$

$\delta$ : generator rotor angles

$\omega$ : generator rotor frequencies

$\theta$ : voltage angles at the buses

**Goal:** inducing an unobservable unstable mode

Perturbation	$\ \Delta\ _F$	Unobservable mode
Disconnect load 1 ( $[S_{ll}]_{1,2} = 0$ )	4.60	10.92
Stop generator 1 ( $\dot{\delta}_1 = 0$ )	2.59	$10.92 \pm 20.95j$
Modify impedance (53 lines modified)	2.34	$10.92 \pm 10^4j$

Creating artificial dynamical symmetries seems to require smaller perturbations than disconnecting the network

# Conclusion

## Summary

- 1 New resilience measure for network systems
  - extending classical observability radius
- 2 Formulation as optimization problem
  - heuristic algorithm for its solution
- 3 Study of networks with random weights
  - focus on network topology
  - different types of graphs  $\rightarrow$  different observability radii

**Note:** everything can be translated to controllability

# Conclusion

## Summary

- 1 New resilience measure for network systems
  - extending classical observability radius
- 2 Formulation as optimization problem
  - heuristic algorithm for its solution
- 3 Study of networks with random weights
  - focus on network topology
  - different types of graphs  $\rightarrow$  different observability radii

**Note:** everything can be translated to controllability

## Open problems

- Effective computation of radius  $\delta$
- Refine the upper bound on  $\mathbb{E}[\delta]$
- Find a lower bound on  $\mathbb{E}[\delta]$
- Find more tractable examples (complete graph, grids?)
- Study other random network models
- Apply to more realistic networks